Robin C. Dunford

Robin maintains an active civil litigation practice, primarily defending personal injury claims, and she has provided representation in federal and state jurisdictions. She is engaged in all aspects of civil litigation, from initial case assessment through trial preparation, and including discovery practice and pre-trial motion practice. Her recent actions on behalf of clients include:

  • Prepared successful motion for summary judgment in case against a listing real estate agent alleging failure to disclose a purported property defect, resulting in dismissal of action against agent.
  • Prepared motion for summary judgment on behalf of a Defendant construction company in an alleged sidewalk defect/trip and fall matter, leading to case resolution at a significantly reduced amount.


  • Tulane University School of Law, JD, 1996, cum laude
  • University of California at Santa Barbara, BA, 1992; Political Science, International Relations emphasis


  • Florida
  • Louisiana
  • United States District Courts: Eastern District of Louisiana, Middle District of Louisiana

Professional Activities

  • Louisiana State Bar Association
  • Florida State Bar Association

Reported Case

  • Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 2014-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 851.

Robin was the principal architect and drafter of a motion for summary judgment, and the subsequent writ applications, in a case involving an open and obvious “hazard.” Previously, the Louisiana Supreme Court virtually obliterated application of the open and obvious defense in summary judgment practice.

Due to this challenge in the existing state of the law, the briefing on behalf of the Defendant Insured instead framed the argument as one of no legal duty. Although the District Court denied the original motion, the Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately accepted the application for writ of certiorari.

Following additional briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court, rendering judgment in favor of the Defendant Insured and dismissing it with prejudice from the case.

In this (now frequently cited) case, the Court noted that its prior jurisprudence “should not be construed as precluding summary judgment when no legal duty is owed because the condition encountered is obvious and apparent to all and not unreasonably dangerous.